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Another and Hopefully Final Look at the PropertyPersonal Liberty Distinction of Section 1343(3)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have witnessed increasing confusion and uncertainty
over the proper scope of section 1343(3) of Title 28 of the United States
Code, the jurisdictional courterpart of section 1983 of Title 42. Both
provisions originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 Section 1983
creates a cause of action to redress the deprivation, under color of state
law, of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
or laws. 2 Section 1343(3) grants to the federal district courts original
jurisdiction, irrespective of amount in controversy, over any civil action
authorized by law that is commenced by any person: "To redress the
deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States." ' 3 The confusion, both past and present, has centered
around the problem of determining to what extent, if any, section
1343(3) should be governed by the judicial gloss it received in Hague
v. CIO. In that landmark Supreme Court decision, Justice Stone, in
his concurring opinion, concluded that this jurisdictional section applied
only when "the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not
dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights
...
1-" Justice Stone reasoned that by limiting the scope of 1343(3)
jurisdiction to deprivations of personal rights, as opposed to property
rights, the section could be reconciled with section 1331's requirement
of a jurisdictional amount for general federal question jurisdiction. 6
During the more than 30 years since Hague, lower federal courts
have accorded Justice Stone's "property rights" exception a variety of
1. ActofApr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17Stat. 13.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected
any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
4. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
5. Id. at 531.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (1964) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
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interpretations, ranging from rigid adherence to outright rejection. 7 At
the same time, both the number and nature of civil rights claims brought
in federal courts under section 1983 have increased significantly.8
Partially as a consequence of this increase, the validity of the propertypersonal liberty distinction has continued to be the subject of
considerable dispute. The Supreme Court, content until recently to avoid
further discussion of the scope of 1343(3),' now appears determined to
resolve the issue. The Court has noted probable jurisdiction in Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp.,"0 which questions whether the Stone formula
is a proper construction of 1343(3)." The Court's resolution of this
jurisdictional issue undoubtedly will have a significant impact on the
future course of civil rights litigation in federal courts.
This Note provides an up-to-date survey and analysis of the state
of the law as reflected by recent lower court rulings on the scope of
section 1343(3). The Note also examines the critical issues and policy
questions that are raised by the Lynch appeal and recommends a
course of action for the Court.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE STATUTE AND ITS JUDICIAL

GLOSS

Both the legislative history and early judicial treatment of the Civil
7. Compare Booth v. Lemont Mfg. Corp., 440 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1971) (§ 1343(3) only
confers jurisdiction upon claims based upon infringement of personal rights, not property rights),
with Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (property rights are and
should be protected by §§ 1983 and 1343(3)).
8. See note 206 infra and accompanying text.
9. The Supreme Court has affirmed per curiam 3-judge court dismissals of civil rights
actions alleging deprivations of property rights. Hornbeak v. Hamm, 393 U.S. 9, affg. mem.
283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Alterman Transp. Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 386 U.S.
262 (1967), affg. mene. 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Abernathy v. Carpenter, 373 U.S.
241 (1963), affg. men. 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962). In Hornbeak, however, 3 justices
were of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. 393 U.S. at 9. The Court also
has denied certiorari in cases in which the 1343(3) jurisdiction issue was present. E.g., Caulder v.
Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971);
Escalara v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
853 (1970); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970);
Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967); Bottone v.
Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949); Hingle v. Perez, 312
F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La.), affd mem., 434 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929
(1971). At the same time, the Court has assumed jurisdiction in a number of welfare cases without
discussing the scope of § 1343(3). See notes 93-95 infra and accompanying text.
10. 318 F. Supp. IIII (D. Conn. 1970),prob.juris.noted, 401 U.S. 935 (1971).
II. The Court may face the question in Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla.
1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971), in which the lower court, without discussion,
assumed § 1343(3) jurisdiction over a claim strikingly similar to the complaint in Lynch. See
note 154 infra and accompanying text; cf Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
prob.juris. noted, 402 U.S. 903 (1971).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

Rights Acts are well documented.' 2 Brief reference to these early
developments, however, is an essential preface to the instant inquiry,
as is a careful re-examination of both the rationale of Justice Stone's
jurisdictional test, and the aftermath of Hague, culminating in the now
3
famous Second Circuit decision in Eisen v. Eastman.
A.

Legislative History of 1343(3)

Section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343(3),
originated in the wave of civil rights legislation enacted by Congress
following the Civil War. This era witnessed the adoption of three

constitutional amendments" and the passage of five civil rights
statutes, 5 all of which were motivated by an unmistakable congressional
desire to ensure the emancipated Negro's freedom and equality.' One
of the more notable pieces of reconstruction legislation was the Act of
April 20, 1871, entitled "[a]n Act to enforce the Provisions of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
for Other Purposes. ' 17 Popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, the
statute sought to eliminate the lawless conditions existing in the
Southern States. 8 Section one of the 1871 Act, the predecessor of
12. E.g., H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. JAMES,
THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); L. WARSOFF, EQUALITY AND THE LAW (1938); Bickel,
The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Frank &
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV.
131 (1950); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323
(1952); Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953).
13. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,400 U.S. 841 (1970).
14. The thirteenth amendment, adopted Dec. 18, 1865; the fourteenth amendment, adopted
July 28, 1868; and the fifteenth amendment, adopted Mar. 30, 1870.
15. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; The Enforcement Act, ch. 114,
16 Stat. 140 (1870); the Amendments to the Enforcement Act, eh. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); Civil
Rights Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of March I, 1875, 18 Stat.
335. For an authoritative treatment of the history of these Civil Rights Acts see Gressman, supra
note 12.
16. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (the primary purpose of the
reconstruction legislation was "to place the colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a level
with whites") (Strong, J.); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1872). See
generally authorities cited note 12 supra,
17. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. For a detailed examination of the congressional debates see Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-83, 195-98, 225-34 (1961). The legislative history of the 1871 Act also
is discussed in Note, Civil Procedure: Section 1343(3) Jurisdictionand the Property-Personal
Right Distinction, 1970 DUKE L.J. 819, 833-39; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the
Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1491-92 (1969); Note, The Dombrowski
Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings Violative of ConstitutionalRights,
21 RUTGERS L. REV. 92, 105-13 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-79 (1961); Gressman, supra note 12, at
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sections 1983 and 1343(3), created a civil cause of action to redress the
deprivation under color of state law, of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution. These suits, requiring no
jurisdictional amount, were authorized to be brought in either the
district or circuit courts, which at that time exercised concurrent original
jurisdiction. Congress was not creating any new substantive rights in
adopting the 1871 Act, but instead was exercising its enforcement power
under the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment to secure the

rights granted by that amendment.

9

In 1875, Congress conferred general federal question jurisdiction
on the district courts by enacting what is presently section 133 1.2 Also
in that year Congress consolidated the various federal statutes at large

under separate titles in the Revised Statutes in order to codify existing
law. 2' In the process, the substantive provision of the 1871 Act, which
became the present section 1983, was separated from its jurisdictional
correlate, the present section 1343(3), and the jurisdictional provisions
were placed in the Judicial Code of the Revised Statutes of 1875.
Although the original substantive provision had referred only to the

Constitution, the section appearing in the Revised Statutes was enlarged to provide a remedy for a deprivation of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by federal laws as well. 22 There is no readily apparent

explanation for this change, but it has been suggested that the remedy
was expanded in order to incorporate similar provisions of the earlier

civil rights acts.2 While the jurisdictional grant to the district courts
was identical in scope with the expanded substantive provision,2 4 circuit

court jurisdiction was limited to claimed deprivations of rights,
19. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). "Section [19831 came onto the books as § I of
the Ku Klux Act [sic] of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. It was one of the means whereby
Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
provisions of that amendment." Id. at 171. (footnote omitted).
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. The jurisdictional amount was increased
from $500 to $2000 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552; to $3000 by the Act
of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091; to $10,000 by the Act of July 25, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1,72 Stat.415 (now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964)).
21. See United States v. Moore, 26 F. Cas. 1306 (No. 15, 804) (C.C.W.D. Ala. 1878). "The
object was to consolidate and simplify the law, and the enactment of the Revised Statutes was
not the enactment of a body of law as original legislation, but it was the enactment of a more
convenient expression of the law as it existed on the first day of December, 1873." Id. at 1307.
See also 2 CONG. REC. 129 (1873) (remarks of Mr. Poland, Chairman of the Committee on
Revision of the Laws).
22. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875).
23. Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. Civ.
RIGHTS -Cv. LIB. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1970).
24. Rev. Stat. § 563(12) (1875).
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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or by "any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights." One theory advanced to
explain the addition of the "equal rights" limitation on the circuit court
jurisdiction is that it was intended to ensure jurisdiction over claims
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.26 In any event, when
Congress, in 1911, abolished the circuit courts' original jurisdiction and
merged the two jurisdictional provisions into what is now section
1343(3), the "equal rights" limitation was retained in the revised
jurisdictional grant to the district courts. 27 Although textually the cause
of action granted by section 1983 appears broader than the jurisdiction
conferred by section 1343(3), there is nothing to indicate that Congress
intended a difference in scope. 28 Nevertheless, a number of courts have
given section 1343(3) a literal reading and, in the absence of a
constitutional claim, have refused to entertain jurisdiction over section
1983 suits alleging violations of federal statutes that are not "Act[s]
of Congress providing for equal rights. ' 29 Apart from the property
rights exception first articulated in Hague, however, the two sections
reading in cases of claimed
usually have been given a coextensive
3°
deprivations of constitutional rights.
B.

Early JudicialDevelopments

The unhappy fate of reconstruction legislation in the hands of the
25. Id. § 629 (16).
26. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; A full discussion of this theory
can be found in Note, supra note 12, at 1292-93.
27. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
28. Legislative history sheds little light upon the reason Congress retained the limiting phrase
"providing for equal rights" in the revised jurisdictional grant. See S. REP. No. 388, 61st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1910). For a discussion of several explanatory theories, as well as the problems
engendered by this variance in language between the substantive and jurisdictional provisions, see
Herzer, supra note 23, at 7-16 and Note, supra note 12, at 1292-93.
29. E.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969) (claim that state administration
of welfare benefits conflicted with Social Security Act); Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d
Cir. 1969) (allegation that state statute reducing monthly welfare benefit payments violated Social
Security Act), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397, 402 (1970) (upholding pendent jurisdiction);
McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951) (violation of Federal Communications Act).
But see Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947) (civil rights
jurisdiction sustained over school teacher's claim that her discharge from employment because
of one month's absence while serving on federal jury violated Judicial Code) and the criticism of
that decision in Note, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145, 150-51
(1961) and Note, supra note 12, at 1291-93; cf. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968) ("We
intimate no views as to whether and under what circumstances suits challenging state AFDC
provisions only on the ground that they are inconsistent with the federal statute may be brought
in federal courts").
30. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
853 (1970).
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Supreme Court is too well known to require recitation. 3' The Court
frustrated the intent of Congress not only by emasculating the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,3 2 but also by
declaring several of the Civil Rights Acts unconstitutional.3 3 As a result
of these decisions, which severely limited the rights entitled to federal
protection, the Civil Rights Acts fell into virtual disuse.3
In the few cases under section one of the 1871 Act that reached
the Supreme Court, no attempt was made to define accurately what
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" were
entitled to protection under the statute. In the companion cases Carter
v. Greenhow and Pleasants v. Greenhow,3 1 decided in 1884, the Court
denied civil rights jurisdiction over allegations that the state had
impaired the plaintiffs' contract rights. The Court reasoned that since
the right to nonimpairment of contracts was not "directly conferred,"
it was not "secured" by the Constitution within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Act. 3 The Court, however, found it unnecessary to consider what
rights are secured for purposes of the Act. Sixteen years later, in Holt
v. Indiana Manufacturing Co.,35 the Court refused to uphold civil rights
jurisdiction over an action to enjoin state taxation of patent rights that
allegedly violated federal patent law. Again avoiding the task of
definition, the Court merely noted that: "[a]ssuming [sections 1983 and
1343(3)] are still in force, it is sufficient to say that they refer to civil
rights only and are inapplicable here."'3 9 Subsequently, in Truax v.
Raich4" and Crane v. Johnson 4 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of
31. E.g., R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 40-47 (1947); Gressman, supra
note 12, at 1336-43.
32. In Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Court held that the privileges
and immunities clause embraced only those rights arising from national citizenship such as the
rights to be protected on the high seas and abroad, to travel to the national capital, and to sue
in federal courts. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), added another restriction by
holding that the fourteenth amendment was a limitation only on the states and not private
individuals.
33. E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3'(1883) (invalidating provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, which outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations and
places of amusement); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (declaring unconstitutional
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which made it a criminal offense to conspire to
deprive any person of equal protection of the laws).
34. See Note, supra note 12, at 1286.
35. 114 U.S. 317 (1884).
36. 114 U.S. 323 (1884).
37. 114 U.S. at 322.
38. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
39. Id. at 72.
40. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
41. 242 U.S. 339 (1917).
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district courts to entertain equal protection challenges to state statutes
that resulted in discriminatory employment practices. In neither case,
however, did the Court attempt to define the limits of the jurisdictional
provision. Thus, in 1939, when the Hague case reached the Supreme
Court, the scope of 1343(3)'s predecessor lacked any authoritative
definition.
C.

Hague v. CIO

In Hague, the plaintiffs brought suit in a federal district court to
enjoin enforcement of city ordinances prohibiting the distribution of
printed matter and the holding of public meetings without permit,
alleging that the ordinances violated the union members' rights of free
speech and peaceful assembly. Both the district court and the court of
appeals found jurisdiction under what are now sections 1331 and
1343(3). 42 The Supreme Court reversed as to section 1331, since the
plaintiffs had failed to establish the requisite jurisdictional amount.43
Although no opinion commanded a majority, the Court upheld
jurisdiction under 1343(3).
Justice Roberts, writing the lead opinion, 44 held that the reference
in the jurisdictional provision to "any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution" should be interpreted to cover only alleged
violations of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Since, however, the plaintiffs had been prohibited from
disseminating information about the National Labor Relations Act, he
concluded that their privileges and immunities of national citizenship
had been abridged and affirmed jurisdiction on this basis.4"
Justice Stone, in his concurring opinion, 46 declined to hinge the
decision on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Instead, he concluded that the rights of speech and
assembly are secured to all persons, regardless of citizenship, by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that violations of these
rights under color of state law are actionable under the Civil Rights
statute. Turning to the jurisdictional question, Justice Stone thought it
necessary to reconcile the parallel existence of what are now sections
1331 and 1343(3). He was certain that when the 1875 Congress created
42. 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939), affg 25 F. Supp. 127 (D.N.J. 1938).
43. 307 U.S. at 507-08.
44. Id. at 500.
45. Id. at 512-13.
46. Id. at 518. Justice Stone was joined on the jurisdictional aspect by Chief Justice Hughes
and Justice Reed.
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general federal question jurisdiction by enacting the predecessor of
section 1331, it had not i-ntended to abolish the jurisdiction already
authorized by what is now section 1343(3). Not only is the latter
section clearly limited to suits arising under section one of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the present section 1983, but also a subsequent
amendment to the federal question jurisdiction provision excluded
1343(3) actions from the jurisdictional amount requirement.4 7 Since,
before the creation of federal.question jurisdiction suits could be brought
under 1343(3) without any requirement of jurisdictional amount, Justice
Stone believed that Congress, by retaining both provisions in the Judicial
Code, desired the earlier 1343(3) practice to continue. He, therefore,
reasoned that neither provision could be interpreted as abolishing the
other and concluded that:
By treating [1343(3)] as conferring federal jurisdiction of suits brought under
the Act of 1871 in which the right asserted is inherently incapable of pecuniary
valuation, we harmonize the two parallel provisions of the Judicial Code, construe
neither as superfluous, and give to each a scope in conformity with its history and
manifest purpose."

Later in his opinion, Justice Stone articulated what has been
accepted generally as the property rights exception to 1343(3) jurisdiction: "[W]henever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not
dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights,
there is jurisdictioh in the district court under [section 1343(3)] of the
Judicial Code to entertain it without proof. . . [of an] amount in controversy. . . ."" That this later language correctly states the distinction

he intended would seem to be evident from the opinion itself. Significantly, Justice Stone noted with approval the Court's earlier decisions
in Raich and Crane, upholding 1343(3) jurisdiction over suits challenging discriminatory employment practices. In discussing these cases he
observed that "[iun both the gist of the cause of action was not damage
or injury to property, but unconstitutional infringement of a right of
personal liberty not susceptible of valuation in money." 50 It seems clear,
however, that both the loss of employment benefits and claims for
damages for such deprivations of personal liberty as assault and false
imprisonment are capable of valuation. It is apparent, therefore, that it
was not Justice Stone's intention that federal courts decline 1343(3)
47. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, amended what is now 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1964) as follows: "[T]he foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in
controversy shall not be construed to apply to any of the . . . succeeding paragraphs of this
section."
48. 307 U.S. at 530.
49. Id. at 531-32.
50. Id. at 531.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

jurisdiction in all cases in which the subject matter could in some way be
valued. A number of the better reasoned decisions applying the Stone
formula have adopted this position, limited the property rights exception to instances of damage or loss of physical property, and taken

jurisdiction in cases having deprivations of rights that are capable of
pecuniary valuation.51 As will be seen, however, even under this
approach, the distinction is difficult to apply and often leads to inconsistent results.
D.

The Aftermath of Hague

Although the property-personal liberty distinction announced in

Hague has occasioned much criticism by jurists5 2 and scholars13 alike,
it has survived, and many courts continue to follow it with varying
degrees of consistency.- In only one decision,55 has a district court flatly
rejected the distinction and this holding has been disapproved by the
Seventh Circuit.56 In a number of cases, however, the Stone formula
has been ignored completely or at least not mentioned, 57 while in other
51. E.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1970); Eisen
v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 564 n.7 (2d Cir. 1969). But cf. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement
at 13, in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1111, prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 935
(1971) ("The dispositive portion of [Justice Stone's] opinion, therefore, is not the language which
the Second Circuit has wrenched from its context, but rather his statement that § 1343(3) 'at
least must be deemed to include suits in which the subject matter is one incapable of valuation.'
307 U.S. at 530 (emphasis supplied)" (footnote omitted)).
52. E.g., Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Collins v. Bolton,
287 F. Supp. 393, 401 (N.D. 111.1968); Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549, 554-56 (M.D.
Ala. 1968). (dissenting opinion); Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351, 354, 357 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
53. E.g., Laufer, Hague v. C.LO.: Mr. Justice Stone's Test of Federal Jurisdiction-A
Reappraisal, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 547 (1970); Note, Section 1343 of Title 28-Is the Application
of the "'CivilRights-PropertyRights" Distinction to Deny JurisdictionStill Viable?, 49 B.U.L.
REv. 377 (1969); Note, Civil Procedure:Section 1343(3) Jurisdiction,supra note 17; Note, supra
note 12; Note, The "Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction-Confusion
Compounded, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1208 (1968).
54. E.g., Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1968) (action by corporation
to recover bank deposit held by receiver); Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967) (class
action by taxpayers); MeManigal v. Simon,382 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 980 (1968) (dispute between members of corporation and its governing body); Howard v.
Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1967) (action by prisoner to recover property unlawfully taken
by sheriff); Martin v. King, 298 F. Supp. 420 (D. Colo. 1969) (claim that action by town marshall
in impounding plaintiff's livestock violated due process).
55. Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351, 354 (N.D. III. 1965) ("Neither logic
nor policy compels the conclusion that property rights are less deserving of protection under the
Constitution and Civil Rights Act than are human freedoms").
56. Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1966) (action against state officials,
alleging slander of title to realty, dismissed for want of 1343 (3) jurisdiction).
57. E.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970) (termination
of tenant's leasehold interest in federal housing project without notice or hearing); Blume v. City
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cases, the courts simply have avoided the distinction by classifying the
property right as one of personal liberty.5
An examination of the various approaches taken by the courts
makes it clear that Justice Stone's test is "considerably easier to state
than to apply." 59 The formula's major weakness is that it ignores the
difficulty of distinguishing between property rights and personal rights
when the loss of property clearly affects valuable personal interests. The

inherent difficulty in the characterization is illustrated by the first cases
under section 1343(3) that reached the Supreme Court following the
Hague decision. In the companion cases of Douglas v. City of Jeannettel°
and Murdock v. Pennsylvania,6 members of the Jehovah's Witnesses

challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting
solicitation of merchandise without a license, on the ground that the

ordinance denied their rights of free speech and religion. The Court
upheld jurisdiction under the Hague test, concluding that the first
amendment claim alleged a deprivation of personal liberty. As the
dissenting opinions suggest, however, the cases could be viewed just as
accurately as challenges to the validity of a municipal ordinance that
regulated sales of goods; then, the rights infringed would have been only

property rights.62

of Deland, 358 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966) (appropriation of property without due process); McGuire
v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964) (alternate holding) (state land commissioner's sale of land
challenged as impairment of contract obligation); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964)
(discriminatory denial of liquor license); Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953)
(teacher's claim against city council for impairment of contract right to salary and denial of equal
protection); Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948) (alleged deprivation of property
without due process); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947)
(discriminatory revocation of liquor license); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.
1946) (architect's claim of discrimination in denying building permits); see Supreme Court
decisions discussed at note 93 infra and accompanying text.
58. E.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (suit challenging landlord's
preemptory seizure of tenant's personal property pursuant to state landlord lien statute); Esclara
v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (constitutional challenge to
termination of tenant's leasehold interest without notice or opportunity to be heard); Willis v.
Reddin, 418 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1969) (depriving prisoner of funds necessary to make bail); Gomez
v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum) (migratory farm
worker's claim for wages); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) and Klim v.
Jones. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (constitutional challenges to seizures of property pursuant
to landlord's or innkeeper's liens); Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Wis. 1970)
and Roberge v. Philbrook, 313 F. Supp. 608 (D. Vt. 1970) (constitutional challenges to reduction
of welfare benefits).
59. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 1969).
60. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
61. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
62. Id. at 119 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 139 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 179
(Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting). At least one other federal court has entertained jurisdiction
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Undoubtedly, Stone's formulation has found its most consistent

application in cases challenging the constitutionality of state taxation
statutes. Courts generally have held, although not without dissent,63 that
these actions cannot be maintained under section 1343(3)." Moreover,
the Supreme Court has affirmed per curiam several lower court

dismissals of civil rights actions attacking state taxation statutes.6 These
results have been criticized, however, and with some justification." There
would appear to be no reason why the right to be free from

discriminatory taxation is any less of a "personal right" than are a
number of other rights that, although capable of pecuniary valuation,
are typically characterized as personal for purposes of the Hague

distinction.67 On the other hand, it is arguable that tax assessment cases
should be outside federal court jurisdiction irrespective of how they fit

the Stone formula, since congressional policy has long favored federal
abstention in state taxation cases and has so provided in section 1341.68
As a result, it has been suggested that many of the tax cases could be
disposed of pursuant to this congressional mandate, without resorting

to the property-personal liberty distinction.69 Closely akin to the tax
cases are those actions addressed solely to the deprivation of property.

Most courts have treated these claims as involving only property rights
and thus outside the scope of section 1343(3).70
under § 1343(3) in a case in which the plaintiff complained of a restriction on his right to solicit
funds. Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961) (charitable association's
challenge to municipal ordinance).
63. E.g., Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549, 554 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
64. E.g., Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th
Cir. 1966), Buckingham v. Lord, 326 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont. 1971); Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283
F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Alterman Transp. Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486
(M.D. Tenn. 1966); Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township School Dist., 247 F. Supp., 296
(E.D. Mich. 1965), affd, 378 F.2d 225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967); Abernathy
v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962). Contra, Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243
F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
65. Hornbeak v. Hamm, 393 U.S. 9 (1968); Alterman Transp. Lines v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 386 U.S. 262 (1967); Abernathy v. Carpenter, 373 U.S. 241 (1963).
66. Note, Section 1343 of Title 28, supra note 53; Note, The "PropertyRights" Exception
to Civil Rights Jurisdiction,supra note 53.
67. E.g., Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970) (real estate agent's license); Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor license); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (employment).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964) provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S.
521 (1932). See also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 127 n. 17 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
69. Note, The "'Property Rights" Exception to Civil Rights Jurisdiction,supra note 53, at
1214.
70. E.g., Spears v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. 1970) (suit against state to recover
face amount of bond and interest); Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1966) (action alleging

1971]

SECTION 1343(3) JURISDICTION

1001

When elements of both property rights and personal rights are
involved, however, the Stone test breaks down. In this class of cases,
the courts frequently have found a means to uphold jurisdiction. Many
courts, for example, have sustained civil rights jurisdiction over suits
alleging discrimination in the issuance of business licenses. While the
denial or revocation of a business license would appear to affect only
a property interest, the courts have tended to view these cases as deprivations of the plaintiff's right to engage in a business of his choice. 71
Thus jurisdiction has been asserted over due process and equal
protection challenges involving liquor licenses, 72 building permits, 73 and
garbage collection franchises. 74 Similarly, cases involving discrimination
in employment usually are held cognizable under Stone's interpretation
of 1343(3).7' Although loss of employment is arguably a mere
deprivation of property in the form of wages, most courts have followed
the early Supreme Court decision in Raich and considered the right to
work to be a personal right.
The cases upholding jurisdiction over claims alleging
discriminatory treatment in licensing and employment might be
explained on the basis that the plaintiff has been deprived of his right
to be treated equally, a personal right .independent of the interest
affected. 7 Unlike a deprivation of due process, in which a specific
substantive interest is infringed, a denial of equal protection is said to
abridge both a substantive interest and the individual's right to be
treated equally. This analysis, although initially appealing as a possible
explanation for numerous decisions that have upheld 1343(3) jurisdiction
without mentioning the property-personal liberty distinction, encounters
serious obstacles. For one thing, a number of courts have expressly noted
that for purposes of the Stone distinction, the equal protection and due
process clauses have no substantive content of their own, independent
slander of title to realty); Hingle v. Perez, 312 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1970) (alleged unlawful
destruction of real property).
71. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1969) ("These [cases] can be
viewed about equally well as complaining of a deprivation of the personal liberty to pursue a calling
of one's choice or of the profits or emoluments deriving therefrom").
72. E.g., Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947).
73. Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).
74. Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967).
75. E.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (summary dismissal of physician
from public hospital); Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1953) (salary dispute);
Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 825 (1947) (discharge of school
teacher).
76. Note, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, supra note 29, at 162.
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of the injury that might result from their violation.77 On the other hand,
it is arguable that if the right to equal protection can be elevated to a
position of independence from the underlying substantive interest, so
also should be the right to due process. Moreover, there is language in
Monroe v. Pape7" that would indicate that the rights to equal protection
and due process both have status as independent civil rights. In that
landmark case, decided in 1961, the Court upheld a section 1983 action
for damages against police officers who had conducted a warrantless
search and arrest. Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority of eight,
stated that an "[a]llegation of facts constituting a deprivation under
color of state authority of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of [section 1983]."' 7
Significantly, the Court neither mentioned the Hague distinction nor
distinguished between property rights and personal rights. This omission
prompted one writer to conclude that "[a]s a result of the Monroe
decision,'4t seems unlikely that the district courts can avoid becoming
forums for litigating every invasion of personal and property interests
alleged to be a denial of due process.""0 Subsequent decisions, the most
notable of which is discussed in the section that follows, indicate,
however, that the Hague rule survived Monroe without significant
change.
E.

Eisen v. Eastman

In 1969, the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Friendly in
Eisen v. Eastman,8s reaffirmed its allegiance to Justice Stone's test. The
Eisen opinion is highly significant because of the careful scrutiny it
accorded Hague and because of the numerous decisions that have relied
8
on its interpretation of Justice Stone's formula. 1
Eisen concerned an action by a landlord against a city rent and
rehabilitation director, alleging that a reduction of maximum rents
chargeable under the city's rent control law violated the landlord's
constitutional right not to be deprived of property without due process
of law. The district court held, for erroneous reasons,3 that the action
77. E.g., Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1968); Roberge v.
Philbrook, 313 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Vt. 1970).
78. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
79. Id. at 171.
80. Note, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, supra note 29, at 160; cf. Chevigny, Section
1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HAv. L. REV. 1352 (1970); Note, Limiting the Section 1983
Action, supra note 17.
81. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).
82. The case is cited more frequently by courts wishing to dispel any doubts over the
continuing vitality of the Stone distinction. E.g., Weddle v. Director, 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1970).
83. The district court opinion is unreported.
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could not be maintained under the Civil Rights Act. The appeals court
affirmed, but upheld the denial of jurisdiction under section 1343(3)
because the complaint alleged injury to a property right only.
Judge Friendly noted at the outset that the increasing incidence of
civil rights suits in federal courts, brought by plaintiffs who prefer
litigating in the federal forum to pursuing their state remedies, had
prompted the court to examine the jurisdictional questions in greater
depth than the disposition of the case demanded.14 Turning to the
property-personal liberty distinction of Hague, he concluded that
"[t]here seems to be something essentially right about it, especially if
one accepts, as we do, his premise that the overlap between 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) should be explained in some rational
way." -5 Moreover, the judge found that Justice Stone's definition
encompassed virtually all the cases 6 in which the Supreme Court had
sustained jurisdiction under section 1343(3). He therefore concluded,
"although with a good deal less than complete assurance," that Justice
Stone's Hague formulation, generously construed, should continue to
be regarded as the law in the Second Circuit.8 7
One commentator observed shortly after the decision in Eisen that
"[p]erhaps Judge Friendly was aware, that one may 'generously
construe' any test to such an extent that it is no longer meaningful and
then may be unceremoniously discarded." 8 It is believed, however, that
the judge's holding generously construed the test simply to reflect what
the weight of decisions makes abundantly clear-that Stone's formula
must be generously construed if it is to be workable at all. As already
noted, a number of courts, rather than generously construing the test,
have ignored it altogether. It seems most unlikely, however, that Judge
Friendly either envisions or advocates discarding this limitation on civil
rights jurisdiction since his introductory remarks in Eisen, as well as
statements in later opinions, 9 indicate a deep concern over problems
of judicial administration in federal courts. Eisen, therefore, should be
viewed as an unequivocal approval of the Hague distinction and a
number of courts have so interpreted it. Significantly, the lower court
ruling in Lynch was based expressly on Eisen, and this presumably
prompted the Supreme Court's noting of probable jurisdiction.
84. 421 F.2d at 561-62.
85. Id. at 565.
86. For a discussion of the one Supreme Court case that might be an exception see notes
90-92 infra and accompanying text.
87. 421 F.2d at 566.
88. Note, Civil Procedure:Section 1343(3)Jurisdiction,supra note 17, at 839.
89. See note 202 infra and accompanying text.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since the Eisen decision the courts have continued to grapple with
the property-personal liberty distinction. Several courts have expressed
new doubts concerning both the validity and utility of the test. On the
other hand, a significant number of courts purport to approve the rule
without question. Recent decisions, however, indicate that few courts
feel bound to a mechanical application of the test. As a result,
considerable confusion over the proper scope of section 1343(3)
continues to exist. In addition to the kinds of civil rights actions already
discussed, current 1343(3) litigation encompasses a substantial body of
new claims, the most notable of which are of the welfare and Sniadach
variety. The most recent developments in each of these areas will be
discussed in turn.
A.

The Welfare Cases

Judge Friendly noted in Eisen that the one Supreme Court case
that was difficult to fit within Justice Stone's formula in Hague is King
v. Smith. 0 There the Court expressly found section 1343(3) jurisdiction
over a welfare recipient's challenge to Alabama's "substitute father"
regulation, under which the state had terminated her benefits because
she had been visited by a man, and had had sexual relations with him.
Without explanation, the Court stated in a footnote that "[j]urisdiction
was conferred on the court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) . . . ."" Judge
Friendly suggested that King v. Smith might be reconciled with Hague
on the theory that the regulation not only caused economic loss to the
petitioner's children, "but also infringed their 'liberty' to grow up with
financial aid for their subsistence and her 'liberty' to have [her suitor]
visit her on weekends." 2
Since Eisen, there have been a number of Supreme Court decisions
on various aspects of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program in which the Court assumed, without discussion, that
the requirements for 1343(3) jurisdiction had been met.9 3 The broadest
90. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
91. Id.at3l2n.3.
92. 421 F.2d at 564. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), would appear to cast considerable doubt on the proposition that children
have a constitutional right to subsistence. Similarly, with all due respect to Judge Friendly, it is
not believed that the freedom to participate in illicit sexual relations can be viewed as a federally
protected right.
93. E.g., Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275 (1970); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v.
Solman, 396 U.S. 5 (1969) (per curiam); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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statement relating to jurisdiction is found in Rosado v. Wyman,94 in
which the Court noted: "[O]nce petitioners filed their complaint alleging
the unconstitutionality of [a New York Welfare Statute], the District
Court . . . was properly seized of jurisdiction over the case under
§§ 1343(3) and (4). . .. "Is
Recent lower court rulings on challenges to state administration
of public assistance programs have varied considerably in their
treatment of the jurisdictional issue. A few decisions do not mention

the Hague limitation on 1343(3) jurisdiction." Other courts have
concluded that the recent Supreme Court decisions on the merits in
welfare cases are dispositive of the question. 97 Nonetheless, a number

of decisions, notably in the Second Circuit, have reasoned that the
absence of a specific reference to Hague in Supreme Court welfare
decisions does not mean that the Court has abandoned the Stone
formula sub silentio. 5 Accordingly, these courts have examined case by
case the nature of the welfare recipient's claim to determine if it involves
elements of personal liberty. Drawing upon the language in recent

Supreme Court opinions, a number of courts have postulated that a
termination or denial of welfare benefits can and often does result in
more than just economic loss.99 The problem in welfare cases then, as

in general 1343(3) cases, lies in determining when the loss becomes a
deprivation of a personal right.' ® One district court, for example, held
that unless a welfare recipient demonstrates that the denial of welfare

assistance threatens his subsistence, jurisdiction cannot be founded on
section 1343(3).101 The difficulty with this approach is clearly illustrated
94. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
95. Id. at 403. The Court further noted that "we find not the slightest indication that
Congress meant to deprive federal courts of their traditional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal
questions in this field." Id. at 422.
96. E.g., Stinson v. Finch, 317 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F.
Supp. 289 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
97. E.g., Ojeda v. Hackney, 319 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317
F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Kaiser v. Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
98. Eog., Johnson v. Harder, 318 F. Supp. 1274, 1276 (D. Conn. 1970), rev'd, 438 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1971).
99. E.g., Roberge v. Philbrook, 313 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Vt. 1970).
100. Compare Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F. Supp. 385, 391 (D. Conn. 1969) (jurisdictionupheld
over constitutional challenge to welfare department policy limiting maximum grants for school
clothing, reasoning that children have a "liberty . . .to have clothing to wear to school"), with
Middagh v. Harder, Civil No. 13, 661 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 1970) (jurisdiction refused over challenge
to welfare department policy denying any school clothing allowance to dependent children who
had received income from summer employment, concluding that the children had not been deprived
of a liberty).
101. Campagnuolo v. Harder, 319 F. Supp. 414,417 (D. Conn. 1970), rev'd, 440 F.2d 1225
(2d Cir. 197 1).
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by the recent case of Johnson v. Harder.10 2 There a mother and her
children, who were AFDC recipients, challenged the state welfare
department's practice of including Old Age, Survivors and Disability
Insurance benefits that certain members of the family were receiving
in calculating the monthly AFDC award to the entire family unit. The
district court held that the suit was not cognizable under section 1343(3),
reasoning that since the controversy was whether the family was entitled
to receive more by virtue of its dual eligiblity than the state had
determined was essential for subsistence, no right of personal liberty
was affected. 0 3 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed., ° That
court recognized that it was again facing the problem posed in Eisen
of reconciling federal court jurisdiction over welfare cases with the
Hague limitation. Citing Judge Friendly's analysis of King v. Smith
in Eisen, as well as later Supreme Court decisions, the court concluded:
"Since welfare cases by their very nature involve people at a bare
subsistence level, disputes over the correct amounts payable are treated
not merely as involving property rights, but some sort of right to exist
in society, a personal right under the Stone formula."0 5
This statement, along with a supporting footnote,' seems to
indicate that the Second Circuit had determined to exempt all welfare
cases from the "property rights" limitation on section 1343(3)
jurisdiction.1 07 The court's more recent decision in Roberts v. Harder,""
however, has revived the confusion by refusing jurisdiction over an
AFDC recipient's challenge to the state welfare department's policy of
allocating a portion of her assistance grant directly to her landlord. The
court concluded that since the department's arbitrary action did not
reduce the total amount of assistance available to the plaintiff, her claim
did not fit the Johnson jurisdiction formula.' 0 ' Whatever else may be
said of this result, it undermines the desirable certainty that Johnson
purported to bring to this area of civil rights litigation."0
102. 318 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Conn. 1970).
103. Id. at 1277.
104. 438 F.2d7 (2dCir. 1971).
105. Id. at 12.
106. "We realize that questions may be raised as to whether the expansion of the Stone
formula to include all welfare cases is justifiable while upholding the continuing validity of Hague."
Id. n.6.
107. See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509 (D. Conn. 1971). In upholding
jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to state action in reducing medical payments, the court
cited Johnson and observed that "[t]he hitherto troublesome problems of fitting all welfare cases
within § 1343(3) . . .have now been resolved for the district courts in this circuit." Id. at 513
(footnote omitted).
108. 440 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1971).
109. Id. at 1230.
110. Cf. Campagnuolo v. Harder, 440 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Licensing and Employment Cases

As previously observed, the courts readily have assumed 1343(3)
jurisdiction over suits alleging discriminatory or unfair licensing and
employment practices even though they purport to be following the
Hague limitation on jurisdiction. With one notable exception, 1 , the
most recent decisions have continued this practice.
A 1970 Second Circuit decision in an occupational licensing case
is especially noteworthy. In Gold v. Lomenzo,1 2 the court upheld
jurisdiction under 1343(3) to entertain an action to enjoin the suspension
of a real estate broker's license. Judge Friendly, speaking for the
majority, stated simply that "we are content to follow the prevailing
view sustaining civil rights jurisdiction in such cases ....
,," Judge
Hays, dissenting, concluded that the case clearly lacked the elements
of personal liberty essential for 1343(3) jurisdiction."' In his view, the
plaintiff, whose license had been suspended because of excessive
commission charges, had only to return the illegally obtained fees in
order to have his license restored-a step that solely injured his property.
Thus, he reasoned that this situation was clearly distinguishable from
that court's earlier decision in Birnbaum v. Trussel"5 in which civil
rights jurisdiction was sustained on the ground that a doctor's removal
from a hospital staff position under charges of racial prejudice was
bound to injure the physician permanently in his medical career.
More recently, the Second Circuit further refined its position
regarding 1343 (3) jurisdiction over alleged deprivations of employment
opportunity. In Tichon v. Harder,"' the plaintiff, a probationary
employee with the Connecticut Department of Welfare, sought damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief against dismissal from her position
in violation of procedural due process. Despite the suggestion in Eisen
that jurisdiction should be entertained in these cases because they
complain of a "deprivation of the personal liberty to pursue a calling
of one's choice,""17 the district court denied relief and the court of
appeals affirmed. Significantly, the appeals court noted at the outset
that a claim of denial of procedural due process has no independent
jurisdictional significance under section 1343(3)."S The Hague test
III. See notes 116-23 infra and accompanying text.
112, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970).
113, Id. at 961.
114. Id. at 962-63.
115. 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
116. 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971).
117. 421 F.2d at 565.
118. 438 F.2d at 1399. But see Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d
853 (2d Cir.) discussed at page 1011 infra.
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focuses instead on the interest claimed to be injured by the denial of
procedural due process. Reviewing prior cases in which the court had
assumed jurisdiction over discharges from public employment,"' the
court concluded that not every dismissal under circumstances denying
procedural due process presents a basis for jurisdiction under 1343(3).
The court held, therefore, that for purposes of civil rights jurisdiction
the impact of a dismissal must be of such substantial injury to the
employee's reputation that it will destroy effectively his ability to engage
in his occupation.' Interestingly, the Tichon court cited the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau'2 ' for the
proposition that, in some circumstances, injury to reputation alone is
sufficient to sustain section 1343(3) jurisdiction. That case challenged a
state statute that authorized police to post public notices prohibiting
the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons allegedly possessing undesirable character traits; the Court struck down the statute on the
ground that the failure to provide notice and a hearing to affected
individuals violates due process. Jurisdiction was based on section
1343(3).122 The court in Tichon, however, reasoned that the damage to
good name, reputation, honor, and integrity at stake in Constantineau
is not inherent in every employment dismissal case.123 The Second
Circuit has just given further consideration to the propriety of section
1343(3) jurisdiction over a claim alleging damage to reputation,
although not in connection with a dismissal from employment. In Dale
v. Hahn, 2 1 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a New York
mental health statute under which her conservator had been appointed
without notice or hearing. Since the plaintiff sought, as a portion of
the relief requested, the recovery of money expended by the conservator,
the district court held, as one ground for dismissal, that section
1343(3) jurisdiction was improper.'2 The court of appeals reversed and
upheld jurisdiction on the ground that the stigma and consequences to
119. The court distinguished Birnbaum on the ground that Miss Tichon "had no profession
or occupation and no accumulated reputation as a competent worker which the state arbitrarily
destroyed; and she was not discriminated against by reason of race." 438 F.2d at 1402.
120. 438 F.2d at 1402 & n.9. In an afterthought, the court admitted that the plaintiff might
well be entitled to relief on the merits, but observed that "the conception of jurisdiction under
§ 1343(3), which is limited to deprivations of those constitutional and federal statutory rights of
personal liberty not dependent for their existence on property rights, and which is founded on
important policies of federalism, denies the [plaintiff] a forum in federal district court." Id. at
1403.
121. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
122. Id. at 434 n.l, 438 nA.
123. 438 F.2d at 1401 n.8.
124. 311 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971).
125. 311 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
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reputation resulting from conservatorship involved more than a property
right; the adverse impact of the appointment on the plaintiff's personal
liberty would exist regardless of the alleged illegal use of her money. 2
In light of these recent cases, it would appear that in appropriate
circumstances damage to reputation will support section 1343(3)
jurisdiction in the Second Circuit, and in cases of alleged summary
dismissal from public employment, it may well be the decisive
27
consideration. 1
The jurisdictional test adopted by the Second Circuit for dismissals
of public employees undoubtedly will undergo additional modification
in its application to cases alleging discriminatory hiring practices.
In the latter situation the complaint sounds in equal protection and an
accurate measurement of the impact on a plaintiff's future livelihood
will be more difficult. A recent California decision took a dim view of
the property rights exception in a case of alleged discrimination in hiring
public employees. In Penn v. Stumpf, 8 the plaintiff alleged that tests
given to applicants for positions with the police department were discriminatory. In upholding 1343(3) jurisdiction, the district court criticized Stone's formula and stated that, if faced with the problem as a
matter of first impression, it would reject a strict property-personal
liberty test of civil rights jurisdiction. The court held, however, that
even under this test the plaintiff's claim established 1343(3) jurisdiction
since employment is far more precious than a mere property right. 2 1
C. Miscellaneous Deprivationsof Property
Other recent cases have applied the Stone formula for 1343(3)
jurisdiction to various kinds of property deprivations. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has followed Eisen and
approved the Hague rule in National Land & Investment Co. v.
Specter,'3" a case in which corporate stockholders sought to enjoin state
investigative and criminal proceedings that threatened their business
venture. Some lower court decisions in that circuit, however, both before
and after Specter, have refused to permit the Stone formula to defeat
jurisdiction over alleged unconstitutional deprivations of property.,
126. 440 F.2d at 636.
127. Cf Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971) (jurisdiction entertained
over public school teacher's claim that his discharge was arbitrary).
128. 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
129. Id. at 1245-46.
130. 428 F.2d 91, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1970).
131. See, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Swarb v. Lennox,
314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970),prob.juris.noted, 401 U.S. 991 (1971).
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The Fourth Circuit, in Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution,3 2
overruled an earlier decision and adopted the Hague test as the law of
the circuit. Although convinced that a custodial officer's seizure of
personal property from a juvenile offender deprived the youth of his
property without due process, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the suit under 1343(3). The Eighth Circuit also reaffirmed
the Hague test in Spears v. Robinson'3 by upholding the dismissal of
a suit against a state for interest on a bond. Recent decisions by the
Seventh Circuit'3' and a district court in the Ninth Circuit 35 have
unequivocally held that the Stone formula precludes 1343 (3) jurisdiction
over claims alleging deprivations of mere property rights. Similarly the
Hague distinction has had recent advocates in the Fifth Circuit. In
Hingle v. Perez,3 6 a Louisiana district court dismissed for lack of
1343(3) jurisdiction an action by property owners alleging illegal
destruction of their real property by public authorities. The court noted
the troublesome history of Stone's formulation, but concluded that the
distinction facilitates the proper allocation of litigation to a suitable
forum. 3 7 That the Fifth Circuit is far from achieving unanimity over
the scope of Stone's property rights exception is illustrated by the
court's decision in Gomez v. FloridaState Employment Service. 38 This
was an action by migratory farm workers alleging deprivations of wages
and benefits. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction under
1343(3), but the court of appeals reversed. In dictum, the court expressed
doubts concerning the Hague distinction, but reasoned that, in any
event, it was unnecessary to determine the extent property rights are
outside section 1343(3), since the essence of the plaintiffs' claim is the
denial of essentially personal rights affecting subsistence and

livelihood. '3
Mention should be made also of recent cases dealing with
terminations of leases in public housing projects. Several courts, notably
the Second Circuit in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority'
132. 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970); accord, Howard v. Higgins, 379 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.
1967) (similar facts). Contra, Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1969) (similar facts).
133. 431 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. 1970).
134. Booth v. Lemot Mfg. Corp., 440 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1971) (action challenging
municipality's failure to reassess leases of public property to reflect current value).
135. Buckingham v. Lord, 326 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont. 1971) (alleged discriminatory
taxation).
136. 312 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1970), affd mem., 434 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1970).
137. Id. at 129.
138. 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
139. Id. at 579 nn.36 & 37.
140. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
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and the Fourth Circuit in Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority,14'
have assumed 1343(3) jurisdiction over claims that a termination prior
to a hearing violates due process. In Caulder the court assumed
jurisdiction without discussion, 42 reasoning that a tenant's interest in
his leasehold is analogous to that of a welfare recipient in his monthly
check. The Second Circuit, however, sustained jurisdiction in Escalera
on a puzzling basis. The court acknowledged the validity of Stone's
property-personal liberty distinction for civil rights jurisdiction but then
predicated jurisdiction on the plaintiff's alleged "deprivations of
procedural due process, a civil right ....1"1 While no one may quarrel
with this result, the court's inconsistent approach can only cloud further
what is already a misunderstood and misused rule of law. 144
D.

Sniadach Progeny

4
In the 1969 landmark case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'
the Supreme Court held that prejudgment garnishment of an alleged
debtor's wages, without notice or opportunity to be heard, violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court based its
decision on the fact that wages are a special form of property whose
loss can create severe hardships. As a result there has been much
speculation concerning the extent that Sniadach might be extended to
other kinds of debtor's property.'" Relying on the Sniadach decision,
numerous suits have been instituted challenging various state procedures
for prejudgment seizure of debtor's property. Significantly, a number
of these actions have been brought in federal courts raising a threshold
question of jurisdiction under 1343(3). Since these suits complain
primarily of a deprivation of property without due process, it might be
expected that the courts would refuse to exercise 1343(3) jurisdiction
1 47
because of the Stone limitation. With a few notable exceptions,
however, the courts generally have found little difficulty in sustaining
jurisdiction over these actions.
One of the first federal court decisions extending Sniadach was
141. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970).
142. 433 F.2d at 1001.
143. 425 F.2d at 864; cf. McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir.
1970); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1132-33 (D. Mass. 1910).
144. See, e.g., Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1968) (for purposes
of 1343(3) jurisdiction, an allegation of a denial of procedural due process has no independent
jurisdictional significance); accord,Tichon v. Harder, 438 F.2d 1396, 1399 (2d Cir. 1971).
145. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
146. Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1970); 68 MICH. L.
REV.

986 (1970).
147.

See note 159 infra and accompanying text.
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Klim v. Jones,48 in which a California district court declared that state's
Innkeepers' Lien Law unconstitutional. Jurisdiction was found to exist
under both sections 1331 and 1343(3). In discussing 1343(3) jurisdiction,
the court intimated doubts concerning the efficacy of the propertypersonal liberty distinction, but concluded that, in any event "it will
not bar the plaintiff's claim in the present action since his claim is not
for 'mere' property, but rather for property which is his means of
employment and support and hence incapable of pecuniary measure."'"
0 the Fifth Circuit upheld 1343(3) jurisdiction over
In Hall v. Garson,"1
a suit challenging the constitutionality of a landlord's lien statute. While
the court expressed doubts about the Stone test itself, it deemed it
unnecessary to pass on the scope of the asserted "property exemption"
of Hague. Instead the court found that the rights infringed were not
merely the rights to use the property seized by the landlord, but the
right of the tenant to be secure in his home and free from invasion of
that home without prior procedural protection.' A similar result was
reached by a New York three-judge district court in Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co., 52 which upheld a conditional vendee's claim
that prejudgment attachment of a debtor's household necessities without
prior notice and hearing violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The court, however, used the presence of a fourth
amendment claim as its basis for concluding that the Stone distinction
was inapposite. 53 In a case presenting almost identical facts, a Florida
54 assumed 1343(3) jurisdiction
district court, in Fuentes v. Faircloth,1
without discussion, but denied relief on the merits.
In contrast with these cases, several courts have faced the question
more directly and have refused to permit the property-personal liberty
distinction to defeat 1343(3) jurisdiction over Sniadach claims. In
Santiago v. McElroy,5 5 for example, a Pennsylvania district court
struck down that State's statute authorizing a landlord's distraint and
sale of a tenant's chattels without notice and hearing, on the ground
that the procedure was violative of procedural due process. After noting
its uncertainty over whether property rights are excluded from 1343(3),
148. .315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
149. Id. at 115.
150. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
151. Id.at 438.
152. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
153. Id. at 721. The court also cited Escalara for the proposition that a deprivation of
procedural due process is a sufficient basis for 1343(3) jurisdiction.
154. 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970),prob.juris.noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
155. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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the court went on to find that the plaintiff's claims involved more than
mere property rights. The court reasoned that the dispossession of
household goods may leave the low income family without the necessities
of life and render their personal rights meaningless. The court concluded:
"We think . . . that recent Spreme Court rulings dealing with welfare
rights decide, at the very least, that the deprivation of this kind of
property, i.e., property necessary to keep a family at subsistence level,
is covered by 28 U.S.C. 1343(3)."' s More recently, a Maryland district
court sustained jurisdiction over a retail installment purchaser's claim
that the State's replevin procedures were unconstitutional., 7 Citing
Santiago, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs right to possess essential
household goods was sufficiently personal to avoid the Hague limitation
on 1343(3) jurisdiction.
Many of these cases seem to indicate that the specialized nature
of property is not only crucial in determining whether Sniadach is
apposite, but it also may be dispositive of the threshold jurisdictional
question. In Kerrigan v. Boucher,5 8 for example, the Connecticut federal
district court concluded that an alleged unconstitutional deprivation of
personal belongings, which included the plaintiff's artificial dentures,
eye glasses, clothing, household furnishings and other effects, pursuant
to the state's boarding house lien law, was cognizable under section
1343(3). On the other hand, in a recent Florida case, in which a
conditional buyer challenged the procedures whereby his automobile was
repossessed, the district court concluded that "[a]n automobile is no
more than a piece of property and § 1343(3) does not confer jurisdiction
on this court for alleged deprivation of property rights."' 59 The court
obviously was unimpressed by the plaintiff's allegation that the
automobile was a specialized kind of property. It was by similar
reasoning, although the property involved was money in checking and
savings accounts, that the Connecticut District Court dismissed the
complaint in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.""
156. Id. at 291; accord, Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (action
challenging constitutionality of Pennsylvania replevin procedures authorizing immediate
repossession of debtor's property by creditors under writ of execution issued without notice or
hearing). Having concluded that § 1343(3) jurisdiction was proper, in light of the fourth
amendment claim, the court observed: "We need not be concerned with an evaluation of the
advantages or disadvantages of a broad or narrow construction of Justice Stone's Hague
formulation at this point since there is alleged in this complaint a valid basis for Federal
jurisdiction. As we view the remaining allegations, apart from the Fourth Amendment, they state,
as alleged, grounds in some respects similar to those recently ruled upon by the Supreme Court."
326 F. Supp. at 131-32 (citations omitted).
157. Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971).
158. 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971).
159. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604,605 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
160. 318 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1970), prob.juris.noted, 401 U.S. 935 (1971).
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LYNCH V. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP.

The Lynch appeal to the Supreme Court poses a formidable
challenge to the property rights exclusion of section 1343(3). The case
dramatically illustrates both the conceptional and practical difficulties
that are inherent in Justice Stone's formula and the appeal calls for a
policy decision of far-reaching significance to federal judicial
administration. For these reasons, the case itself, the issues raised by
the appeal, and the underlying policy question merit thorough
consideration.
A.

The Lower Court's Opinion

In the lower court, class actions were brought by owners of a
savings account- and of a checking account, respectively, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that their constitutional
rights were impaired by the Connecticut prejudgment attachment and
garnishment statutes.' The due process claim was based on Sniadach.
The facts alleged in the respective complaints were taken as true by the
court in ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the Lynch
action, 62 the plaintiff was a hospital employee earning 69 dollars a week,
which she used to support herself and her children. Two years earlier,
she had authorized her employer to withhold ten dollars weekly from
her wages for deposit in the hospital credit union. The plaintiff alleged
that the deposited wages were used for necessary medical, rent, food,
and clothing expenses. The defendant Household Finance Corporation,
in conjunction with a suit on a note against plaintiff in state court,
secured a writ of garnishment that subsequently was served on the
hospital credit union. The garnishment of plaintiff's savings account
took effect on service of the writ, without notice to the plaintiff or
opportunity to be heard. Thereafter the plaintiff was unable to draw
Connecticut's prejudgment attachment and garnishment procedures are contained in
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-279 to -346 (1968). Under these provisions attachment or
garnishment of an alleged debtor's real and personal property is authorized in a civil action in
which a creditor is seeking money damages. The levy is initiated by the creditor's attorney, who,
in his capacity of Commissioner of the Superior Court, signs and issues the writ of attachment
or garnishment, together with a summons and complaint. No court order is required for the
issuance of the writ except in the case of garnishment or foreign attachment of a checking account
in excess of $5,000. Attachment or garnishment is effected by service of the writ, along with the
summons and complaint, by the sheriff upon the person who either has possession of the debtor's
property or is indebted to the debtor. The officer serving the writ also is required to serve the
debtor with a copy of the writ and accompanying papers. Once the debtor's property is attached,
the attachment may be dissolved upon the debtor's securing a bond with surety.
162. Brief for Appellant at 6, 7, Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 318 F. Supp. IllI (D.
Conn. 1970).
161.
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upon the deposited wages to meet necessary expenses, was too poor to
afford a surety bond to procure release of the garnishment, and as a
result suffered severe hardships. In the companion case, Toro v.
Camposano,"3 a landlord had garnished, without notice or hearing, the
plaintiff's checking account into which the plaintiff regularly deposited
the modest wages she used for necessary family expenses. As a result
of the garnishment, the plaintiff experienced serious difficulties,
including damage to her credit and reputation, and exposure to possible
criminal prosecution for overdrawn checks. Both plaintiffs, as low
income wage earners, were forced to endure these hardships although
they allegedly had valid defenses to the creditors' state court suits.
Confronted with the impractical choice of either settling the creditors'
claims or suffering their assets to remain frozen until trial on the merits
in state court, the plaintiffs invoked the protection of the Civil Rights
Act in federal court.
The three-judge panel dismissed both actions for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.' Although the court admitted that there was no
question of the substantiality of the constitutional claim, 16 5 it held that
Eisen was dispositive of the threshold question of 1343(3) jurisdiction.
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the court observed:
Interference with a Connecticut resident's right to the uninterrupted use of
her bank account, like the interdiction of a New Yorker's right to rely upon an
undiminished amount of rental income from his property, has to do almost entirely
with the loss of money; it involves, at most, only an incidental deprivation of
personal rights in the sense of "personal liberty, not dependent for its existence
upon the infringement of property rights.""'6

The court reasoned that access to funds held in savings and checking
accounts is virtually indistinguishable from simple ownership of the
money. As a result, the court concluded that unless the right to own
or use the money is closely linked to expenditures used to secure or
protect personal rights, it is outside the protection of 1343(3). Otherwise,
any plaintiff could claim that money taken under color of state law was
marginal to his subsistence and thus negate Eisen. Finally, the court
stressed the impracticality of defining a class of plaintiffs who would
be so adversely affected by garnishment of savings accounts that their
163. Id. at 7, 8 (Toro and Lynch were consolidated for disposition by the court).
164. As an alternative ground for dismissal, the court held that the actions were barred by
the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) which provides that "[a] court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments." 318 F. Supp. at 1114, 1115.
165. 318F. Supp. at1115.
166. Id. at 1114 (court cites Hague and Eisen).
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rights of personal liberty could be said to be infringed. Interestingly,
the opinion indicates that deprivations of property, including money,
which threaten an individual's subsistence are an exception to the
16 7
property rights exclusion from section 1343(3) jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, in certain situations the garnishment of savings or
checking accounts will threaten a debtor's subsistence and the facts
alleged in the Lynch complaint seem to depict such a situation. The
court, however, appears to have based its dismissal on what it considered
to be the impractical task of defining a suitable class of plaintiffs. Thus
it is arguable that the case should not be read as holding that
prejudgment garnishment of a debtor's bank account can never infringe
upon a right of personal liberty that will support jurisdiction under
section 1343(3). Nevertheless, the dismissal of the instant actions has
triggered an appeal that promises to resolve questions of far greater
scope than the narrow factual determination made by the lower court.
B.

The Issues on Appeal

The appellants have raised two issues in their appeal from the
district court's dismissal of their complaints. 68 The only one important
to the present inquiry is whether the district court erred in dismissing
the actions for want of section 1343(3) subject matter jurisdiction. To
answer this question requires the resolution of several additional
questions: first, whether Justice Stone's Hague distinction is a proper
construction of section 1343(3); secondly, assuming the Stone formula
is correct, whether it applies to property that is essential for subsistence;
and thirdly, assuming the first and second questions are answered
affirmatively, whether the district court improperly concluded that the
plaintiffs' bank accounts are not subsistence property.
The question whether Justice Stone properly interpreted the
jurisdictional provisions of the Civil Rights Act probably will be treated
as a matter of first impression by the Supreme Court. Although the
167. "Unless such a right to own or use one's money is closely linked by custom to an
expenditure to secure or protect a right which is in some sense 'personal' and incapable of monetary
valuation, as might be the case with welfare payments and wages, it is outside the protection of
§ 1343(3)." Id.
168. Both parties also have briefed extensively the question whether the actions are barred
by 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Brief for Appellant at 35-44 and Brief for Appellee at 23.49, Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 318 F. Supp. I111 (D. Conn. 1970). Apart from the problem of determining
if the instant garnishments are "proceedings in a state court," the Court apparently will be pressed
to decide whether an action brought under § 1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception to the
anti-injunction ban of § 2283. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54-55 & nn.I & 2 (1971)
(Stewart, J. concurring); Note, The FederalAnti-Injunction Statute and DeclaratoryJudgments
in ConstitutionalLitigation, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1870 (1970).
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Court has affirmed per curiam several dismissals of civil rights actions
for want of jurisdiction under Stone's construction of section 1343(3),69
it has conspicuously avoided discussing the question. Moreover, the
Court has sustained 1343(3) jurisdiction in a sufficient number of cases
involving property rights to raise doubts concerning the Hague test. 7
In any event, even a cursory examination of lower court decisions points
up the need for clarification.
Since there is nothing on the face of section 1343(3) to support
Justice Stone's property-personal liberty distinction, it is appropriate
first to inquire whether there is anything in the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, or other reconstructional legislation, to
indicate that Congress intended to exclude property rights from the
scope of 1343(3) jurisdiction. Significantly, the Supreme Court has
traced the origin of sections 1983 and 1343(3) to the Civil Rights Act
of 1866,171 which clearly recognized property rights among the civil
rights that it protected.' 72 In the recent case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 7 3 the Court stated that the purpose of the 1866 Act was to
"'affirmatively secure for all men, whatever their race or color, what
[Senator Trumbull] called the 'great fundamental rights': 'the right to
acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to
enforce rights in courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose
of property.' "'7 Since section 1343(3) speaks of rights secured by any
"Act of Congress providing for equal rights," it seems clear that it was
intended to encompass those property rights secured by the Act of 1866.
More is the persuasive evidence, including the the voluminous record
of congressional debates, 75 that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
169. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
170. Cases cited note 93 supra and accompanying text.
171. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 183-85 (1961); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 508
n.10 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
172. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by § 18 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1964)) provides
in relevant part: "That all persons born in the United States. . .are hereby declared to be citizens
. . .and . . . shall have the same right, in every state and territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
173. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) to bar all racial discrimination,
private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property).
174. Id. at 432.
175. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 509-10 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 75-78, 90-91, 94-97 (1908); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMIENDIENT 183-85 (1951); Gressman, supra note 12, at 1331-32.
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incorporated in section one of the fourteenth amendment. 7 As Justice
Harlan, concurring in United States v. Arizona, 77 recently commented:
"Section 1 [of the fourteenth amendment] must have been seen as little
more than a constitutionalization of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, con7
cededly one of the primary goals of that portion of the Amendment.'
As its very title indicates, the 1018 Civil Rights Act of 1871, from
which the present sections 1983 and 1343(3) derive, was intended to
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, which included
the rights secured by the 1866 Act. Senator Edmunds, then chairman
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, described the Act of 1871
as follows: "The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to,
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States
when they are assailed by any state law or under color of any state law,
and it is merely carrying out the principles of the [Civil Rights Act of
1866] which has since become part of the Constitution [the fourteenth
amendment]."' 79 In addition, abundant evidence indicates that the
Congress which enacted the 1871 Act was responding to lawless
conditions in the South that threatened both life and property. 8 Finally,
the Supreme Court's thorough discussion of the 1871 Act in Monroe
v. Pape supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to exclude
property rights from the Act's sweeping protection." Instead, the Court
found that the purpose of the 1871 Act was to provide a remedy for the
deprivation, under color of state law, of any right secured by the
2
fourteenth amendment.1
In the face of this overwhelming evidence of congressional intent,
it would appear that the only other possible explanation for the
176. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Eliot); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2462 (1866) (remarks by Rep. Garfield).
177. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
178. Id. at 162; accord, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 10 (1948), in which the Court
observed: "It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own,
and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers
of that Amendment as an essential precondition to the realization of other basic civil rights and
liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee."
179. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871).
180. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the response of Congress to President Grant's message
of Mar. 23, 1871, in which he stated: "A condition of affairs now exists in some states of the
Union rendering life and property insecure. . . . The proof that such a condition of affairs exists
in some localities is now before the Senate. . . . Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation
as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the
... CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
244 (1871).
181. 365 U.S. 167, 171-83 (1965).
182. Id. at 171.
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property-personal liberty distinction is its parallel existence with the
general federal question jurisdiction of section 133 1.It is questionable,
however, whether the coexistence of the two jurisdictional provisions
requires explanation since a construction of section 1343(3) that accords
with the intent of the Congress that enacted it clearly does not render
section 1331 superfluous. Section 1343(3) is carefully confined to alleged
deprivations under color of state law and is, therefore, narrower in scope
than section 133 1. The former section's legislative history only reflects
a congressional purpose to maintain federal vigilance over unconstitutional state actions, whereas section 133 1's purpose extends
well beyond the sphere of state action. Suits against federal officials,
for example, are the exclusive province of section 133 1. Similarly, there
is no evidence that the 1875 Congress intended that the predecessor of
section 1331 limit the civil rights jurisdiction it created four years earlier.
On the contrary, the Act of 1875, creating general federal question
jurisdiction, traditionally has been heralded as an expansion of federal
judicial power-a "revolutionary development.'" Significantly, Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,"'
recently characterized the general federal question jurisdiction conferred
by section 1331 as an enlargement of federal jurisdiction.'8 5 This view
accords with the Court's earlier discussion of federal judicial power in
8 6
Zwickler v. Koota.1
It should be observed also that in the past, when
Congress has decided that specific controversies are more appropriate
for state forums, it has expressly restrained the federal judicial hand.
Federal jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of state tax laws, for example,
is explicitly restricted by section 1341 of the Judicial Code. 8 7 There is
nothing to indicate, however, that Congress has determined that suits
authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to redress unconstitutional
deprivations of property should be routed to state forums.
The foregoing discussion would seem to suggest that the Stone
property-personal liberty distinction was not only uncalled for, but is
clearly erroneous. It would be improper, however, to dismiss Justice
Stone's deliberate and thorough discussion of civil rights jurisdiction
183.

F.

FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
65 (1928). See generally H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL

THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

727-33 (1953); C.

WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §

17 (2d ed. 1970);

Chadbourn & Levin, OriginalJurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 642-45
(1942).
184. 400U.S. 433 (1971).
185. Id. at 438 n.4.
186. 389 U.S. 241, 245-48 (1967).
187. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
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as wholly devoid of either logic or purpose. On the contrary, the
responsibility for the erroneous exclusion of property rights from the
scope of section 1343(3) might well be attributed to the failure of modern
courts to take into account that Justice Stone was a product of his time.
Many of these courts have given his language in Hague a literal reading
and, as a result, have stripped his property-personal liberty distinction
of its historical contours. It will be recalled that when Justice Stone
wrote his Hague opinion, the Court had just abandoned its guardianship of private economic interests.' When called upon to judge the
reasonableness of legislative judgments in areas of taxation and
commercial regulation, which private interests challenged on due process
grounds, the Court with increasing frequency exercised judicial restraint,
invoking the principle of presumed constitutionality. At the same time,
however, the Court, largely at Stone's insistence, found itself in what
Learned Hand described as the "logical dilemma" of shouldering
special responsibilities for the protection of so-called personal
liberties.' 89 As Professor Wechsler commented, "[I]t is the paradox of
the period, if paradox it be, that new areas of constitutional protection
were emerging even as the power to govern was being sustained."' 9 It
is probable, therefore, that Justice Stone's distinction between property
rights and personal liberty is closely related to his conception of where
the line should be drawn between judicial deference to legislative
judgments concerning regulation of commercial interests, such as
corporations, and the "narrower scope for the operation of the
presumption of constitutionality" when personal rights are affected.'"'
188. See generally A. MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE 511-35 (1956).
189. Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 COLUM. L. REv.
696, 699 (1946).
190. Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution,46 COLU,%. L. REv. 764, 793 (1946).
191. In United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938), Justice Stone stated
that "[rlegulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators." To this proposition he added a caveat in what has become a
famous footnote: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
"It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
than most other types of legislation. . ..
"Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed
at particular religious or national or racial minorities whether prejudice against discrete and insular
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This interpretation would seem entirely consistent with Professor
Reich's view that the property rights-personal liberty distinction had
its origin in the development of enormous private power in the modern
corporation.192 Significantly, Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co.,," the
one example Justice Stone cited in Hague for the proposition that
-property rights"are excluded from section 1343(3), was a case in which
a corporation challenged the constitutionality of state taxation of its
patent rights. In any event, it is difficult to believe that the author of
the famed Carolene Products footnote' intended that his language in
Hague would be seized upon by modern courts as a pretext for denying
access to a federal forum to litigants such as the plaintiffs in Lynch.
Perhaps it was this realization that prompted one court to state: "From
these words [Justice Stone's concurrence in Hague] have some later
courts concluded, perhaps unfortunately, that actions would lie under
the Civil Rights Act only if a 'personal liberty,' and not a 'property
right,' were involved. This is not what Mr. Justice Stone intended to
say, nor does this conclusion follow necessarily from his words."' 9 5
Since the construction modern courts have given Justice Stone's
property-personal liberty distinction encounters serious textual and
historical obstacles, it would appear that the Supreme Court might well
reject the Stone formula outright. If the Court declines to do so, it will
be faced with the question whether and to what extent the property rights
exception of Hague is itself to be subjected to an exception for property
that is essential for subsistence. It is far too late in the day not to
recognize that in many situations the loss of property rights-whether
wages, government largess, or chattels held under a conditional sales
contract-means a corresponding loss of personal freedom.' 96 A number
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
192. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964).
193. 176 U.S. 68 (1900).
194. See note 191 supra and accompanying text.
195. Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
196. Professor Reich in discussing the functions of property stated that: "'One of these
functions is to draw a boundary between public and private power. Property draws a circle around
the activities of each private individual .... Within that circle, the owner has a greater degree
of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or explain his actions, and show his authority.
Within, he is master. . ..
"Thus, property performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism
in society . . . .The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while the Bill of Rights comes
into play only at extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day
protection in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends
upon the existence of private property." Reich, supra note 192, at 77 1.
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of recent Supreme Court decisions already discussed" 7 recognize that
subsistence property rights are appropriate subjects for 1343(3)
jurisdiction, and lower court decisions continue to add to the list of
property that might be considered essential for liberty.'
The difficulty with retaining the Stone formula subject to an
exemption for subsistence property is well illustrated by the Lynch case.
This approach leaves to individual judges the determination whether a
plaintiffs subsistence is threatened by the property deprivation alleged.
The Lynch court, for reasons that are less than convincing, concluded
that plaintiffs' personal liberty was not sufficiently harmed by the
garnishments. That another court might reach a different subjective
conclusion can hardly be doubted. Similarly, what may not be
subsistence property for one plaintiff may be essential for another. The
automobile is an excellent example. One of the most recent lower court
decisions flatly rejected the contention that the loss of an automobile
was the kind of unconstitutional deprivation upon which section 1343(3)
jurisdiction could be based.' 99 Yet it is not unlikely that the loss of an
automobile eventually could result in the loss of subsistence property
in the form of wages or employment for workers who must travel long
distances to find jobs.20 0 Although clearly preferable to a rigid propertyliberty distinction, a "flexible" Stone test also is objectionable for the
uncertainty and confusion that it inevitably would produce. The recent
lower court decisions just surveyed underscore this objection. For these
reasons, at least, some Supreme Court Justices may conclude that even
the retention of a Stone formula that excludes subsistence property from
its operation is undesirable. It is abundantly clear, however, that the
fate of the property rights exception to section 1343(3) could hinge on
more than the statute's legislative history. It is very possible that the
policy question raised by this appeal will be the dominant consideration.
C.

The Policy Question Before the Court

The policy decision confronting the Court is one of judicial
administration. If the Court resolves to discard the Hague limitation
on 1343(3) jurisdiction, federal courts will be opened to a number of
litigants for whom access would otherwise be denied. Conversely, a
197. Cases cited note 93 supra and accompanying text.
198. E.g., Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971) (personal belongings
included artificial dentures, eye glasses, shaving equipment, undergarments, suit, radio, television
set, and coin collection).
199. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 605 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
200. Cf. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1970) discussed at notes 148 &
149 supra.

19711
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sound endorsement of Stone's formula will route many constitutional
claims to state forums. The arguments in favor of curtailing federal
jurisdiction are receiving increasing support. As one federal judge
recently commented:
[Aippeals to nineteenth-century history and the personal motivation of the
Reconstruction Congressmen who supported the civil rights statutes are of little
assistance. Interpretation of still mooted questions of federal jurisdiction today can
more sensibly be focussed on the problem of the proper allocation of litigation to
a suitable forum. Section [1331] remains as a Congressional direction that, in the
main, federal courts should not spend their time on cases involving less than $10,000
even though federal rights are at issue.2'

One of the most recent and undoubtedly most vigorous expressions
of concern over the volume of civil rights litigation in federal courts
comes from Judge Friendly. In a statement that perhaps sheds

additional light on his opinion in Eisen, the judge warned:
[The framers of the Act of 1871 could hardly have intended it to become
the standard method of constitutional attack upon state action although, until then,
the lower federal courts had scarcely been available for that purpose at all ....
Suits under that statute should not be lightly brought. Apart from the burden they
impose on federal judges and their abrasive effect on federal-state relations, counsel
should never forget . . . that "itmust prejudice the occasional meritorious
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones" . . . . There is thus a
responsibility, resting upon all counsel but especially those for civil rights
organizations, not to swell the tidal wave of actions under the civil rights statute
by bringing suits for declaratory or injunctive relief when no need for this exists."'

Also instructive are the Chief Justice's recent comments concerning

the doctrine of abstention and its role in judicial administration. In
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,20 3 his dissenting opinion strongly urged

that lower federal courts stay their hand in what he described as nonurgent state cases. In discussing the civil rights case before the Court,
which challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that had not
been construed by the state courts, the Chief Justice observed that "it is
the negation of sound judicial administration-and an unwarranted use

of a limited judicial resource-to impose this kind of case on a threejudge federal court, and then by direct appeal, on this Court.

24

The views just quoted, to which many others of a similar vein could
"
be added, 0°

reflect deep concern over the problem of judicial

administration in the federal courts. They are not without foundation.
201. Hingle v. Perez, 312 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. La. 1970).
202. Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d 1139, 1141 (2d Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
203. 400 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1971).
204. Id. at 443.
205. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 427 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Actions under the Civil Rights Act have grown from 296 in the year
1961 to 3,985 in 1970, an increase of 1,246 percent. 26 The increase
between the years 1969 and 1970 alone was 62.5 percent. These statistics,
although they by no means tell the whole story, demonstrate the urgency
of the problem facing the federal judiciary. 20 7 For this reason, there could
be a strong temptation for some members of the Court to uphold the
Hague limitation on 1343 (3) jurisdiction.
The other side of the policy question pertains to the fate of the
litigants who, if the Stone test is approved, would repair to state courts
with their constitutional claims. There are good reasons to believe that
state courts are not always satisfactory forums for the vindication of
federal rights. 208 That there is an inherent potential for bias when state
judges are asked to rule on actions of other state officials admits to
little doubt. 211 It is highly unlikely, therefore, that state court
adjudication of civil rights cases can ever approach the disinterested
fairness and impartiality that obtains in the federal forum. Chief Justice
Burger would appear to be in disagreement with the views just expressed.
He recently observed that "no one could reasonably think that [state
court judges] have less fidelity to due process requirements of the Federal
Constitution than we do . .. ,,210 Conceding to state judges the high
degree of fidelity to the federal constitution of which the Chief Justice
speaks, the institutional setting in which they operate cannot be ignored.
Many state judges are either elected or appointed by an elected governor.
As a result, their decisions are not immune from political scrutiny.
Federal judges, on the other hand, are wholly detached from state
206. 1970 DIRECTOR OF ADM. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP., table
12b. The incidence of state prisoner petitions has shown even more explosive growth. Developments
in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1041 (1970).
207. But see Chevigny, supra note 80, at 1354 (suggesting that the federal caseload of § 1983
cases may be transitional).
208. E.g., Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (per curiam) ("it seems likely that
to require petitioner to appeal to state officials would be to demand a futile act"); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) ("It is abundantly clear that one reason the [Civil Rights Act of
1871] was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens
to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies").
209. In a closely analogous context Professor Amsterdam stated: "Since the inception of
the government, federal courts have been employed in cases 'in which the State tribunals cannot
be supposed to be impartial and unbiased,' for, as Hamilton wrote in The Federalist. '[tihe most
discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the
local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes.'" Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 802 (1965) (citations omitted).
210. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,440 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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governmental operations and, by reason of their life tenure, are insulated
from local pressures. It should be recalled that the potential for state
court bias against out-of-state litigants prompted Congress to provide
for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 21 1 Similar considerations gave
rise to federal removal jurisdiction.2 12 So, too, the expanded federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction has resulted, at least in part, from the failure
of state courts to provide adequate protection to criminal defendants'
constitutional rights.213 Significantly, Justice Traynor, undoubtedly one
of the most distinguished state court judges of this century, noted in
this context that: "'There is some poetic justice in compelling state courts
to resolve in more than provincial terms the problems of policing the
community without oppressiveness. Had all state courts taken the
initiative in that regard there would have been less need for the United
States Supreme Court to become involved in policing the police."2 14
Apart from considerations of partiality, it also should be
recognized that state judges are less likely to be familiar with the
intricacies of federal constitutional law than federal judges. The latter
not only possess more expertise in that area, but undoubtedly are more
knowledgeable of the latest precedents established by the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals. As a result, there is a greater likelihood of
uniform application of federal constitutional law to civil rights actions
brought into federal courts. Illustrative of the variant treatment
Supreme Court precedents receive in state courts are recent decisions,
on the merits,21 interpreting the high Court's ruling in Sniadach. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, has invalidated that state's
procedure for prejudgment garnishment of bank accounts. 211 The
Supreme Court of Arizona, however, has refused to extend Sniadach
to property other than wages. 217 Lack of uniformity among the 50 state
judicial systems eventually may be cured by Supreme Court review, but
the availability of certiorari is subject to well-known limitations. 218
2I.

See, e.g., ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS 99-100 (1969); Amsterdam, supra note 209, at 802-03. But see, Friendly, The Historic
Basis of DiversityJurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928).
212. E.g., City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 836 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
see Amsterdam, supra note 209.
213. See Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus,supra note 206, at 1057-62.
214. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention and Trial, 33
U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 660 (1966).
215. These decisions are to be distinguished from Lynch, wherein the court never reached
the merits.
216. Larson v. Fetherston,44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
217. Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
218. See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 183, at 727-33.
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Lower federal courts, on the other hand, are subject to close appellate
scrutiny by the eleven federal courts of appeals. While this will not
guarantee absolute uniformity, the cohesive influence is more likely to
promote consistency in the area of federally protected rights than are
the diverse appellate procedures of the state courts."1 ' When significant
differences do arise among the federal circuits, expeditious reconciliation
by the Supreme Court will normally follow.
The foregoing discussion suggests that federal rights are best
protected in federal forums. That Congress has enacted a number of
statutes, in addition to the Civil Rights Acts, which exclude selected
federal question cases from section 1331's jurisdictional amount,
supports this conclusion. 221 So also does the American Law Institute's
recommendation that the jurisdictional amount be abolished altogether
in federal question cases. 22 ' Professor Wechsler's observation of almost
a quarter century ago would, therefore, seem appropriate today. In
discussing the Civil Rights Acts, he stated:
There Congress has declared the historic judgment that within this precious area
. . . there is to be no slightest risk of nullification by state process. The danger
is unhappily not past. It would be moving in the wrong direction to reduce the
jurisdiction in this field-not because the interest of the state is smaller in such
cases, but because its interest is outweighed by other factors of the highest national
concern.22

Significantly, the language just quoted was cited with approval by
Justice Brennan in a recent discussion of the inappropriateness of federal
court abstention in civil rights cases. 2 3 Similarly, in Wisconsin v.
224
Constantineau,
the Court flatly rejected the suggestion that federal
courts should stay their hand until state courts have passed on a statute
unconstitutional on its face. These cases suggest that at least some
members of the Court are convinced that in certain circumstances the
federal judiciary must give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal
forum for the determination of his federal constitutional claim,
219.

There are, to be sure, instances when federal court adjudication lacks consistency, one

of the most notable examples being the jurisdictional question under discussion. As one federal
judge recently commented: "[A] district court considering its § 1343(3) jurisdiction in the Fifth
Circuit is not writing on a clean slate, but rather on a palimpsest." Kitchen v. Crawford, 326 F.
Supp. 1255, 1257 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
220. See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 183, at 730-31; Friedenthal, New
Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, II STAN. L. REv. 213, 217 (1959); Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225-26 (1948).
221. AL! STUDY, supra note 211, at 24-25, 172-76.
222. Wechsler, supra note 220, at 230.

223.
part).
224.

Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.13 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in
400 U.S. 433,439 (1971).
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irrespective of the availability of state court remedies.2 2 5 It is equally
clear, however, that other members of the Court hold widely divergent
views concerning the proper role of the federal courts in our federal
system. As a result, judicially imposed restrictions in the developing
areas of federal jurisdiction are by no means a remote possibility. 2 1 In
a series of decisions this past term, most notably Younger v. Harris211
and Samuels v. Mackell,22M the Court placed a new and limiting
construction on the Dombrowski rule 22 concerning federal court
intervention in state criminal trials. The Chief Justice, moreover,
foreclosed any doubts concerning his conception of the federal
judiciary's role when he recently stated that "[t]his Court has an
abundance of important work to do, which, if it is to be done well,
should not be subject to the added pressures of non-urgent state cases
which the state courts have never been called on to resolve. ' 230
Whether the unconstitutional deprivations that presently fail to
meet the Stone test of jurisdiction will be viewed as sufficiently "urgent"
to merit adjudication in federal court remains to be seen. In any event,
it is clear that the all-important policy question underlying this
determination will call on the court to balance the advantages to the
federal judiciary of limiting jurisdiction in a highly litigious area on the
one hand, against the disadvantages to the litigants who would be routed
to state courts for vindication of their federal constitutional rights on
the other. The balance struck may well be dispositive of the Lynch
appeal, irrespective of how the substantive issues are resolved.
V.

CONCLUSION

Following his examination in Eisen of the history of Justice Stone's
property-personal liberty distinction, Judge Friendly remarked, "We
must confess we are not altogether sure just where this leaves us."'
This writer, however, approaches his conclusion with greater certainty.
For reasons that follow, it is firmly believed that the Supreme Court
should reject the Stone test for jurisdiction under section 1343(3).
Congress provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that federal
225. Accord, Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
226. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (forbidding the aggregation of separate
claims to provide requisite jurisdictional amount in federal diversity actions, notwithstanding 1966
amendment to FRCP relating to class actions).
227. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
228. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
229. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
230. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,443 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
231. 421 F.2d at 565.
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courts should be available to redress deprivations, under color of state
law, of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
The far-reaching language contained in the present sections 1983 and
1343(3) was no "mere slip of the legislative pen.1 232 In the absence of
unmistakable congressional intent to dilute the meaning of this
language, the jurisdictional provision should be given "the scope that
its origins dictate." ' Significantly, there is nothing in the legislative
history of the 1871 Act which suggests that "property rights" are to
be excluded from federal civil rights jurisdiction. On the contrary,
legislative history demonstrates that sections 1983 and 1343(3) were
intended to afford protection against unconstitutional deprivations of
both personal and property rights. Moreover, apart from Justice Stone's
concurring opinion in Hague, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
these sections is in accord with this view.2 4 There also is nothing on
the face of section 1331, standing alone or read together with section
1343(3), to indicate that it was intended to limit the scope of the latter
provision. Similarly, section 1331's legislative history does not support
this contention. 35 More importantly, the two sources of jurisdiction
serve distinctly different purposes. It seems clear, therefore, that it is
unnecessary to reconcile the parallel existence of the two provisions.
Finally, it is doubtftil that Justice Stone ever envisaged that his language in Hague would lead to the limitations that modern courts have
imposed on section 1343(3).236
The property-personal liberty jurisdictional test is not only an
incorrect construction of section 1343(3), but it is also unworkable.
Courts applying the distinction are required to determine on a case-by232. Cf Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,427 (1968).
233. Cf. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
234. This assumes that the per curiam affirmances of lower court dismissals of tax cases,
discussed at note 65 supra, are distinguishable on the grounds that federal jurisdiction to enjoin
enforcement of state tax laws is expressly restricted by 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
235. See Chadbourn & Levin, OriginalJurisdictionof Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv.
639, 642-45 (1942).
236. Justice Stone was trying to prevent § 1343(3) from being eclipsed by § 1331, not vice
versa. Note, Civil Procedure: Section 1343(3) Jurisdiction. supra note 17, at 837. This is not to
suggest that no limitations on § 1343(3) would be proper. Clearly, Justice Stone was of the opinion
that corporations were not within the contemplation of the Congress that enacted the 1871 Act.
See notes 188-95 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has persuasively argued: "We doubt that Congress ever intended that a corporation ... should
be able to invoke § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart to enjoin state investigative and criminal
proceedings." National Land & Inv. Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1970). It might
well be appropriate for Congress to address the question whether § 1343(3) should be available
to corporations. The problem with the judicially created property rights exception, however, is
that, while it may have the merit of excluding certain corporate interests from the protection of
the statute, it also excludes legitimate claims of individuals like the plaintiffs in Lynch.
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case basis whether a litigant has suffered a deprivation of liberty or
merely property. This highly subjective test has led to unpredictable and
wholly inconsistent results. Employment and licensing cases plainly
demonstrate the patent irrationality of this approach. In the Fifth
Circuit, for example, arbitrary denials of liquor licenses are cognizable
under section 1343(3).23 In the Second Circuit, however, an arbitrary
denial of the right to work-"the most precious liberty that man
possesses"23-is actionable under section 1343(3) only when the court
is satisfied that the plaintiff's reputation has been sufficiently damaged
by his summary dismissal from public employment.?" Interestingly, the
summary garnishments in Lynch clearly damaged the plaintiffs'
reputations by causing outstanding checks to bounce. Yet the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' subsistence was not sufficiently threatened
by this loss of deposited wages to warrant federal jurisdiction. This
decision, along with others already discussed, illustrates the futility of
attempting to delinate "subsistence property." Civil rights jurisdiction
must be predicated on firmer grounds than these subtle and irrational
distinctions. It is submitted, therefore, that the Stone test, no matter
how flexible or how generously construed, has no place in the jurisdictional law of the federal courts.
It also is believed that policy considerations should not dissuade
the Court from discarding the Stone formula. Admittedly, the federal
judiciary is faced with an administrative crisis. Undoubtedly, both
Congress and the public should give serious consideration to the
admonitions of the Chief Justice. It is equally clear, however, that the
Court should not uphold an erroneous rule of law merely to reduce the
federal caseload. What Justice Harlan recently stated concerning the
Court and judicial administration seems readily applicable here. In a
case presenting policy questions similar to those in Lynch, he wrote:
Judicial resources . . . are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we
automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly express
a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected
interests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising
from budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the way of the
recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles. 24 0

It is all too apparent that many courts are using the Stone test for section
237. E.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
238. Barsky v.
239. Tichon v.
240. Bivens v.
398 (1971) (Harlan,
fourth amendment).

Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Harder, 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971).
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
J., concurring) (recognizing federal cause of action for damages under the
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1343(3) jurisdiction as a tool of judicial administration. As a result, they
are automatically closing the federal courthouse doors to victims of
unconstitutional state action, without regard for the merits of their
claims. In Lynch, low-income wage earners were barred from
vindicating in a federal forum the very rights that the Supreme Court
established for them in Sniadach. Ironically, had these plaintiffs alleged
summary garnishment of bank accounts containing 10,000 dollars, the
court would have entertained their constitutional claims. 241' This
incredible result should convince the Supreme Court that the demise of
Justice Stone's property-personal liberty distinction is long overdue.
JOHN LECORNU
241. That access to federal court is, in some circumstances, determined on the basis of wealth
raises questions concerning the constitutionality of the jurisdictional amount requirement. See
Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D.R.I. 1969). See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7, 12 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Bynum v.
Connecticut Comm'n on Forfeited Rights, 410 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969). But see Goldsmith v.
Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1398 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 960 (1970).

